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This paper assessesthe impact of external shocks and adjust-
ment policies on basic economic and social concerns particularly on
the vulnerable income groups during the period 1973-1985, with the
end in view of designing and implementing more effective policies
and programs.
The paper isdivided into sevensections. Section I (Introduction)
describes the prevailing domestic and international economic sce-
nario from 1973 to 1985 and sets the general background for the
study. Section II discussesthe conceptual framework of the study,
broadly tracing the impact of external shocks and adjustment
policies on the transmission mechanisms and on basicsocial concerns
and specific groups. Section III presents an analysis of the nature and
implications of external shocks and policy responses of the Phil-
ippine economy during 1973 to 1983, while Section IV evaluates
the adjustment measures in responseto the economic crisis during
1984 and 1985. Section V analyzes the impact of the external
shocks and adjustment policies on households, agriculture, and
public expenditures particularly on social services.Section VI eva-
luates the second round effects of reduced income and declining
employment opportunities on basic social concerns. Finally, Sec-
tion VII concludes the study and recommendsa package of policy
reforms and program measureswhich will promote economic reco-
very in the short-term and sustainablegrowth and improved human
conditionsin the longrun.
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I. Introduction
The early periods of the 1970s and 1980s were hard times for
the world economy. 2-he inflationary experience of the early 1970s
was followed in late 1973 by a sharp increasein the price of oil, and
in 1980-1982, by the most severe recession experienced in the
developed countries in the postwar period. Despite the widening
balance of payments deficits experienced by the non-oil developing
countries, most of them were able to weather the effects of the first
oil shock relatively well. However, the second oil price increasecame
in 1979 and with it came a deeper and prolonged world recession.
The Philippines was not spared the impact of these external
shocks. Becauseof the large role of trade and agriculture in its
economy, the Philippines has been historically very vulnerable to
fluctuations in incomes, prices and to policy changes in the more
developed countries.
One of the most important consequences of the repeated
recessions, oil shocks, and related fall in the terms of trade was
the running of persistent deficits on current account, as imports
outstripped export earnings. The net terms of trade index fell from
100 in 1972 to 58.7 in 1982. Demand for exports also slowed down
considerably during the period, especially after the second oil shock.
Thus, except for 1973, the Philippines posted persistent and in-
creasing current account deficits, rising from $176 million in 1974
to $3.2 billion in 1982 (Table 1).
To finance the current account deficits, the government resorted
tO foreign borrowings, since net inflow of direct foreign investments
wasvery minimal during the period. As a result, total external debt
outstanding increased from $2.9 billion in 1973 to an unprecedented
level of $24.7 billion in 1982. As ashare 0f GNP, total external debt
outstanding rose from 27 percent in 1973 to 62.8 percent in 1982.
Authorities opted for foreign borrowings since the relatively
favorable conditions in the international financial markets after the
first oil shock made it possible to cushion the impact of the current
account deficit on the overall BOP position. LIBOR from 1975-1977
averaged 6 percent. Real interest rates from 1974 -1977 were
negative, averaging minus 2.9 percent. With external borrowings,
the international reservesincreased.
However, the second oil shock induced a long recession in the
developed countries that resulted in lower export earnings forTABL£ I
SELECTEDINTERNATIONALANDMACROECONOMIC INDICATORS,1973-85 Z
C
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 197_8 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 t985 m
1 Termsof trade(1972=100} 113.3 t14.5 87.8 77.7 71 78.2 8116 68.6 60.4 58.7 61.3 59.8 55.86 m • --I
growthrate (%) 13.3 1.1 --23.3 --11.5 --8.6 10.1 4.3 --15.9 12,0 --2.8 4.4 --2.4 --6.6
F ..
2. Currentaccount balance (US$M) 536 -176 -892 -1050 --752 -t102 -1497 -1904 -2061 -3200 -2750 -1116 -77 m
ratio to GNP(%) -5.1 1.2 5.7 5.9 3.6 4.6 5.0 5.4 5,4 8.1 8.1 3.5 93.1 X
-4
m
3. BOPsurpluS(deficit) IUSSM} 664 t10 --52t --161 164 --54 --570 --381 --560 - 1621 --2068a 258a 2389b m
Z
4. OuUUmding TOTexternaldebtto r
GNPratio(%) 27.0 25.5 31.3 37.5 39.0 44.5 45.2 49.0 54.4 62.8 72.7 78.8 80.4 cn -1-
O
5. LIBOR(3 mon_s) - 5 9.26 t0.23 6.52 5.59 6.11 8.85 12.02 14.11 16.89 t3.20 9.66 10.84 8.39 C)
tA
6. Realint_re_trates 1.56 -2.17 -4.58 -2.71 -2.29 t.65 3.07 2.31 6,99 5.8 4.2 5,5 3.l
Z
O
7. Economic_owth inOECD (tea/) 6.1 0.5 -0.6 5.0 4.0 4.1 3.4 1.3 1.2 -0.3 2.4 2.3 2.2
E
8. Grossln_rnational Re.ryes(USSM) 1037 1503 1361 1642 1525 1883 2423 3155 2574 171t 865 886 1061 C
growt_rate{%) 89.0 44.9 -9.4 20.7 --7.1 23.4 28.7 30.2 --18.4 --33.5 -49.5 2.5 19.7
9. Peso--USSexchangorate 6.756 6.788 7.248 7,440 7.403 7.366 7.378 7.51t 7.9 8.54 11.113 t6.699 18.607- m Z
I-I
10. gea_eff_ctNeexchangcr_e c 93.25 t11.2 102.27 100.26 97.63 88.1 95,94 100`95 107.33 105.18 '86.9T 82.93 89,07 "o O
r-
11. Ratioof NationalBudget deficitt_ GNP 0.5 -0.7 1.2 1.8 1.9 1.2 0.2 1.3 4.0 4.3 1.7 1.8 !.8 O
m
12. Taxeffort{%ofGNP) 8,9 10.4 12.04 11,42 11.10 11,51 _1.9_ 1t.52 10.37 10.06 10.43 9.3_ 10.1 ¢n
13. Domes6c liquidity(billionpesos) 18.t 24.2 28.9 35.9 43.9 51,8 57.4 67.8 82.1 95.3 113.0 121,2 132.9
growthrate(%) 52.2 34.2 19.2 24,3 22.4 18,0 10.7 18.2 21.1 t6.1 18.6 7.3 9.6
t4. GNP,current(billionpe_os) 72.2 99.9 114.4 134.2 153,2 177.0 218.0 264.5 303.6 335.4 378.7 526.3 595.1
reaJ growl_rate{%) 9.3 5.6 6.0 7.2 6.3 5,8 6.9 5.0 3.4 1.9 1.1 -6.8 -3.8
at'Unrevalued andadjus_d for arrears. 01
b/With reschoduling aadadjustments for _rears.
c/An incce_emeans appreciation oftheeffective exchange rate.
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developing countries. The tight monetary policy that these devel-
oped countries adopted dried up Ioanable funds in the international
market, pushed interest rates upwards and shortened the period for
loan maturity.
Despite the chronic current account deficits, the government
authorities pursued expansionary monetary and fiscal policies.
Exchange rate adjustments were very minimal and the real effective
exchange rate appreciated from 93.3 index points in 1973 to 105.2
in 1982. High tariff protection and external borrowings contributed
to the overvaluation of the currency.
The national government has been running budgetary deficits
since 1975, although this was kept below 2 percent of GNP until
1980. In 1981 and 1982, however, this rose to 4 and 4.3 percent
of GNP, respectively, due to a countercyclical expenditure program
and declining government revenues. The tax effort was, at its best,
12 percent in 1975, averaged 11.5 percent in 1976-1980 and
declined to an averageof 10.2 percent in 1981-1982.
The monetary authorities also pursued an expansionary mone-
tary policy, partly due to the burgeoning government budget defi-
cits which had to be financed. Domestic liquidity grew at an average
of 18.7 percent in 1975-1982, peaking at 24.3 percent in-1976.
The deterioration in the terms of trade, the unfavorable exchange
rate policy, expansionary monetary and fiscal policies and heavy
foreign borrowings led to the balance of payments crisis in late 1983.
Another important factor was the assassination of opposition leader
Benigno Aquino which shook the eroding political stability of the
government in power, thus scaring away foreign investors and
bringing to a stop the inflow of new funds from the country's inter.
national creditors.
With a population growth averaging 2.5 percent annually in the
early 1980s, a high incidence of-poverty, and high economic and age
dependency ratios (126.0% and 77.8% in .1985), it is not unexpected
that the economic crisis had serious social costs. Its implications for
policy and planning are just as formidable.
II. Conceptual Framework
The interrelationships of external influences and shocks, adjust-
ment policies, and the transmission mechanisms which affect baSic
social concerns and specific low income groups are traced using the









' _ - -- Z
• _1 1 °




CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK178 JOURNAL OF PHI LIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
The effects of external influences such as unfavorable terms of
trade and low export demand on key macroeconomic variables are
assessed. In response to these shocks, the adjustment policies
adopted are presented' and analyzed. These adjustment policies are
mainly: loan restructuring, economic stabilization, restructuring of
productive sectors, refocusing of development priorities, and social
policy responses.
The basic technique adopted in estimating the effects of the
external shocksand policy responsesrelied heavily on the framework
developed by Bela Balassain his pioneering work, "The New Indus-
trializing Developing Countries After the Oil Crisis".
The framework used provides a way of estimating the BOP ef-
fects of external shocks in the form of the deterioration in the terms
of trade and slowdown in world export demand. The effects
of these shocks are estimated by comparing actual developments
with a postulated situation that would have happened without the
shocks (SeeAppendix for details of the framework).
The impact on households, the rural sector, and public expen-
ditures are then traced mainly through the movement of key indica-
tors. There are many complex processes underlying the linkage
between world economic conditions and welfare but the analysis
of the impact hasbeen mainly in terms of the following transmission
mechanisms:, a) the effects on households through changes in em-
ployment, wages and prices brought about by the impact on aggre-
gate production and demand; b) the consequenceson the rural sector
which is made vulnerable by the changes in the price structure,
incentives system, and agricultural productivity; and c) the impact
of the shifts in government expenditures especially with respect to
socialservices.
The second-round effects of dwindling employment opportuni-
ties, low incomes, and less government support for social services
brought about by the above are then traced particularly in terms of
basic social concerns and special groups. Again, indicators and find-
ingsof other studies are used to assess the direction of the impact.
The study traces these dominant linkages and extends the analy-
sis of the impact or effects on specific concerns mainly through the
use of key development indicators. The framework, however, does
not allow for a more accurate quantification of the impact on spe-
cific social sectorsorgroups , e.g.,labor force participation of women
and children.This is actually the subject of investigation of two otherNUQUI ET AL.: EXTERNAL SHOCKS AND ADJUSTMENT POLICI ES 179
related research studies done by Herrin (1986) and Tidalgo-Miranda
(1986).
Iii. Analysis of External Shocksand ObservedResponses
During the period 1973-1983, the Philippine economy, together
with the economiesof Asian developing countries, were affected by
a number of external developments: two sharpoil increasesin 19"73-
1980, high real interest rates inthe early 1980s and subsequentre-
cessionin industrialized countries.
The effectsof the external shocksin the Philippinesaremeasured
by the terms of trade effects and export volume effects. The termsof
trade effect is a measureof the overall effect of export and import
price movements on the,current account balance.The export volume
effect is a measureof the impact of changesin foreign demandfor
the country's exports.
Evaluation of policy responses, on the otherhand, includesaddi-
tional'.financing from external sources;trade adjustment through
export-expansion and import, substitution; reduction in income
growth targets, thereby reducing demand and imports; and specific
.d_mestic responsessuchastax increases,broadeningof the domestic
tax'base, and increase of public expenditures.
For analytical purposes,the 1973.1.983 period wasdivided into
two phases;namely: 1973-1978, representng the first oil price in-
creaseand years thereafter; and 19"79-1 983, representingthe second
oil priceshockand the subsequentrecessionperiod.
A. Externol Shocks
In terms of the terms of trade effects, the results show that they
had increasingly. burdened the current account and consequently the
balance of payments. The terms of trade effect was relatively more
favorable in the subperiod 1973-1978 as against the :subperiod
1979-1983 due to the higher growth rates generally achieved by ex-
port p[ices than import prices during the earlier subperiod and to the
faster growth of import prices than export prices in the latter period.
From a favorable terms of trade effect in 1973 amounting to 1 per-
cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the terms of trade loss
amounted to 1 percent of GDP in 1974 and roseto 23 percent of
GDP in 1982.180 JOURNAL OF PHI LIPPINE DEVELOPMENT .
Thus, the first oil shockhad relatively lessimpact on the terms of
trade while the effect of the secondoil shock wasmore pronounced.
Meanwhile, the export volume effect of changes in foreign
demand was more •unfavorable in the subperiod 1979-1983 than in
1973-1978. This may be traced to a slackening in demand in the
developedeconomiesaffected by world recessionarytrends.
B. Policy Responses
The year 1973 saw a huge current account surplus of $536
million asa result of the world commodity boom. However, starting
in 1974, the country began experiencing persistentand increasing
current accountdeficits.
Since net inflow of direct foreign investmentswasvery minimal
during the period, an increasingneed for additional net external fi-
nancing becameevident in 1974. Duringthis year, additional net ex-
ternal financing amounted to 7 percent of GDP. By the end of 1983,
this roseto 20 percent of GDP (Table 2). Although additional net
external financing almost exceededtotal external shocksfrom 1973
to 1979, the ratio declined from 366 percent in 1974 to only 77
percent in 1983, implying a relative slowdown in the growth in ex-
ternal debt comparedtothat of total externalshocks(Table 3).
The subperiod1979-1983 sawa higherlevelof external financing
than in 1973-1978 (Table 4). The relatively favorable conditions in
the international financial market in 1976-1979 made the useof ex-
ternal borrowings possible to cushion the impact of the current
account deficit on the overall•BOP position. However, after the
secondoil shock, developedcountriespursueda tight monetary po-
licy which, coupled with "the debt crisis started by Mexico in
mid-1982, dried up Ioanable funds in the international market,
jacked up interestrates,and shortenedthe loan maturity period.The
growing shareof short-term loanstogether with the sharpincreasein
interest rates increasedthe debt service requirementswhich placed
mounting pressure on scarceforeign exchan_ge resources.
Meanwhile, as a result of the country's export promotion poli-
cies,increases in export market shareswere recordedfor most of the
years. The favorable effects were more significant in the 1979-1983
subperiod particularly since export promotion policies, instituted
earlier in the decade,had startedto gainground.
Regarding import substitution, despite the high levelsof trade
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1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 t982 1983 1984 1985 1973-78t979-83 1984-85 m
X
-4
t. ExternalShocks a/ m
a. Te_msof tradeeffect 1 -1 _ -9 -10 -11 -12 -17 -20 -23 -19 -12 -3 -6 -18 -8 Z
r-
Exportpdceeffect 4 15 9 7 8 11 18 22 20 12 15 19 23 9 17 21 cn
Importpdceeffect --3 --16 -t7 --16 --18 -21 --29 --39 --40 --35 --34 --31 --26 --15 --36 --28 -r O
(3
b. Exportvolumeeffect 0 0 --3 --2 -2 -2 -2 -3 --4 --5 -6 -5 -6 -2 -4 -50_;_
c. Tota_externaLshocks 1 -2 -1I -11 -12 -t3 -14 -20 -23 -28 -26 -17 -9 -8 -22 -13 Z
tl. Policyresponses b/
C a. Additionalnet
externalfinancing 1 --7 --14 --T2 --9 --14 -15 - 17 --19 --2_ -20 -_8 --7 --9 -18 -8
m
b. Exportpromotion --1 2 1 -1 --4 -3 -3 -6 --6 -9 -7 -5 5 -1 -6 0 Z -4
c. Importsubstitudon 0 2 2 2 0 2 3 2 1 2 I -3 -3 t 2 -3
r-"
d. Ireporteffectsof 0
lowerGDPgrowthrates 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 -2 -3 1 1 --3 rn
e. Totalresponses 1 -2 --tt --11 --12 -t3 --14 --20 --23 --28 --26 --17 --9 _8 --22 -13
Negative signindicates unfavorable effects.
b/Negativesignindicates positive responses.TABLE 3
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS EFFECTS OF EXTERNAL SHOCKS
AND POLICY RESPONSESAS PERCENT TO TOTAL SHOCKS
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 ,1973-78 1979-83 1984-8S
I. External Shocks a/
a. Termsof tradeeffect 114 -75 --77 --83 -82 -81 --84 --86 - 85 - 83 -- 76 -- 70 - 37 - 80 - 82 -59
Export pdce effect 371 813 81 63 70 83 127 111 87 42 57 109 253 106 77 157
Import price effect 257 -888 --157 -147 -152 --164 -21I -197 -172 --125 --133 -178 -289 -186 -TS9 - 216
b. Export volume effect -14 -25 -23 -17 -18 -19 --_6 -14 -15 -17 -24 - 30 -63 -20 -18 --41
c. Total external shocks 100 -IO0--1CO -100 -100 -100 -100 --100 -100 --100 -100 -100 -100 -100 -'FO0 --100
iJ. Policy responsesb/
a. Additional net C
-n
external financing 126 --366 -128 -110 --78 - 105 -107 -87 -80 - 75 - 77 --48 -78 --112 -85 63 Z
_>
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b. Export promotion -69 128 5 -13 -33 -19 -21 --29 -25 -34 --27 -27 53 -13 -27 13 0
-n
¢. Import substitution 7 120 19 _6 4 _8 21 12 2 7 5 -15 -38 18 9 -27 "o -1-
d. |mporteffects of D
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TABLE 4 _ _
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS EFFECTS OF EXTERNAL SHOCKS m
AND POLICY RESPONSES AS PERCENT TO THE SHOCKS a/ --1
(MILLION USS) i- o.
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 t979 1980 1981 1982. 1983 1984 1985197"3-80 1979-83 1984-85 m
X
-1
L Ex_'nal shocks bl m
Z
a. Terms of trade eff_t 114 --130 -856 -1038 -1164 -1316 --1531 --2366 -2856 --3483 --2914 --17t3 -454 --732 -2630 --1083
Export priceeffect 37] 1407 900 787 995 1335 2317 3032 2935 I750 2209 2661 3138 966 " 2449 2900 r"
--257--_537-1756 --1825 -2160 -265l --3848 --5398 -5791 -5233 -5123 -4374 --3592 -I698 -5079 --3983 Import price effect
O
b._.xportvolume effect --14 -43 --259 -206 -261 -301 -293 --373 -508 -707 --934 --738 -788 -181 -563 --763
t/a
c. Total external shocks 100 -173-1115 -1244 --1425 -1617 -1824 -2739 -3364 -4190 -3848 -245_ -1242 -913 --3193 -1845 3>
Z
O
tl. Policy responses c] ,I>
a. Additional net
external f'tnancing 126 -633--1429 -1.369 -I1_3 --1694 -1959 --2383 --2690 -3129 --2973 --1174 --975 -1019 -2627 --1075 _t_
-I
b, Export promotion -69 221 $3 -163 -464 -315 --378 -806 -849 -- 1408 --1038 -652 660 - 123 --896 4 rn
Z
c, Import substitution 7 207 213 205 52 286 388 323 72 292 198 --372 --47S 162 255 --424 -4
O
d. Importeffects of 1"
lower GDP growth rates 36 32 48 84 100 106 125 128 103 55 -36 --252 --453 68 75 -353
m
e. To_.l responses. 100 -173-11"f5 -1"2.43 -1425 --1617 -]824 - 2738 --3364 -4190 -3849 - 2450 -t243. --912 -3193 -1847
a/'Total responsemay not exactty equal to total externalshockdue to rounding off,
b] Negativesign indicatesunfavorableeffects.
c] Negative signindicatespositive responses.
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tion due to the high import dependence of domestic industries, the
high import content of rising investments, particularly of the public
sector, and the increase in imports associated with the appreciation
of the real exchange rate.
Since the government's main objective was the achievement of
income growth , it did not intentionally pursue import reduction
through income adjustment to cushion the impact of external shocks.
In fact, economic growth averaged 6.3 percent during the 1970s as
compared to 4.9 percent during the previous decade.
Tax increases, as a whole, were adopted by the government as
a policy response to the external shocks. This was more pronounced
during the 1973-1978 period than the 1979-1983 period. Among
the various taxes imposed, domestic taxes took a larger proportion
especially in the 1979-1983 period as the tax burden was shifted
from the external to the internal sector (Table 5).
TABLE 5
FISCAL AND OTHER DOMESTIC RESPONSESOF




A. 2.1 Tax response 105.29 28.54
Domestictax 15.82 40.72
Import tax -15.98 2.30
Export tax 7.92 -1.42
2.2 Domestic tax base - 4.88 7.26
2.3 Public expenditures 2.6 42.22
Capitalexpenditures -25.64 26.22
Current expenditures 28.24 16.02
2.4 Publicfinancing response 55.68 27.34
2.5 Domestic price impact -8.3 1.52
2.6 Trade response 35.36 - 6.84
B. Response of other sectors -91.96 -94.14
• Totals may not add up to 100 due to roundings. Independentestimates.NUOUI ET AL.: EXTERNAL SHOCKS AND, ADJUSTMENT POLICIES 185
Public expenditures expanded, especially during the 1979-1983
subperio.d, with capital expenditures taking in a greater share than
current expenditures. From a level of around 1 to 2 percent of GNP
in the early 1970s, the ratio of public investments to GNP reached
7 percent in the late 1970s and stabilized to about 3.5 percent in
1984 and. 1985. The expansionary fiscal stance in 1981-1982 as a
cou, ntercyclical measure worsened the BOP position in addition to
high _interestrateson foreign loansand other external shocks.
The inflationary impact of the shocks were accommodated
during the period through the expansionary effects of the public
expenditure program and monetary policy. Total domestic credit
expanded by 28 percent annually in 1973-1978 and by 21 percent
in 1979-1983.
On the whole, external shocks were largerthan the deterioration
in the current account position in 1979-1982, implying positive
adjustment. But this did not prevent the slowing down of annual
economic growth to 4.3 percentduringthe period and the debt crisis
which erupted in 1983.
IV. Adjustment Measuresin_1984-1985
The external shocks, together with the economic management
policies instituted by aqthorities during the 1973-1983 period,
resulted in the most severe balance of payments crisisto hit the
coun_tr Y since postwar years. Without replenishment from short-
term borrowings as a result of a crisisof confidence in the govern-
ment which took hold among foreign banks, the international
reserveswere reduce_lto $43P0million in October 1983 from a peak
of about $3.1 billion in 1980. Faced with a foreign exchangeshort-
age, the government declareda seriesof moratoriumson paytnents
of ,principal on its foreign exchangeliabilities and imposedforeign
exchangerestrictions_The Philippineshad to drastically cut back its
imports which were mostly intermediateand capitalgoods.
In responseto the economic crisis,an economic recovery prog-
ram was launched in 1984with the assistanceof the international
economic community. Specifically, the program aimed to attain
external and internal stability, to hasten the restoration of the
normal grpwth process,and to promote equity and total human
development. It was anchored on the following areas, namely: 1)
economic stabilization, 2) loan restructuring, 3) structural adjust-186 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
ments, and 4) realignment of public expenditures. The fifth, which
will be discussed in the next sections, is social adjustment aid.
A. Economic Stabilization
Cognizant of the deteriorating balance of payments, the Central
Bank allowed the peso to depreciate three times starting January
1983 to June 1984 before finally declaring a free float in October
1984. The exchange rate adjustments were accompanied by a num-
ber of temporary exchange controls for the purpose of:discouraging
imports and ensuring that the limited foreign exchange was usedfor
priority imports.
To help further reduce importations, new trade taxes were
imposed. An additional ad valorem duty on all importations was
raised from 3 to 5 percent in November 1983, to 8 percent in April
1984 and finally to 10 percent in June 1984. Additional tariffs and
export taxes per E.O. 920 on logs and lumber, bananasand coconut
products, pineapple and shrimps reversed the trade liberalization
process initiated in 1981. The foreign exchange allocation by the
government, which acted as quantitative restrictions on imports,
gave more protection to heavily protected import substitutes while
penalizing exports.
In contrast to earlier years, monetary policy in 1984 and 1985
was restrictive. The effort was focused mainly on moderating the
expansion of reserve money. The International Monetary Fund
(IMF) program required limits on reserve money levels from P32
billion in December 1984 to P31 billion in March 1985. Reserve
requirements were increased and the Central Bank virtually closed
the subsidized rediscounting window. The Central Bank also intro-
duced the CB bills to help mop up excess liquidity. "The unprece-
dented high rates offered on these bills induced high interest rates
in the whole system (interest on CB and T-bills reached a peak 40
percent and 42 percent, respectively, in November 1984)i resulting
in massivedecline in trade and inventory financing. However, in the
latter part of 1985, nominal interest rates began to decline although
they remained high relative to inflation. The high interest rate policy
implicitly taxed investments and had a negative redistribution ef-
fact. It favored high income groups and reduced employmen't.
Meanwhile, efforts to manage budget deficits consisted of raising
government revenues and controlling the growth of expenditures.NUQUI ET AL.: EXTERNAL SHOCKS AND ADJUSTMENT POLICIES 187
Efforts to raise revenues consisted of increasing tax rates and
widening the tax base as the tax burden was further shifted from
the external sector to the internal sector. Efforts by the national
government to manageits budget deficits produced positive results.
Total budget deficits as a percentage of GNP went down from a
high of 4.3 percent in 1982 to 1.7, 1.6 and 1.8 percent in 1983,
1984 and 1985, respectively.
The deficit in the current account was also drastically reduced
mainly due to the large cutback in imports which went down by
2.3 percent in 1983, by 18.9 percent,in 1984 and by 15.8 percent
in 1985.
The deflationary fiscal and monetary policies cut down the
peak inflation rate of 63.8 percent in October 1984 to 5.7 percent
by end-1985. HOwever, this development alsoproduced unfavorable
effects on output and employment. The Philippine economy shrank
by 5.5 percent in 1984 and 6.8 percent in 1985. Thus, the stabiliza-
tion program in the Philippines, which was touted as generally suc-
cessful, had in fact recessionaryeffects.
B. Loan Restructuring
in December 1984, the Philippines secured a standby credit from
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to support its economic
adjustmen t program. The Paris Club and the Advisory Committee
representing commercial creditors approved loan restructuring
principles to cover maturing debt for the period October 1983 to
December 1986, with a ten-year maturity and a five-year grace
period, and an interest rate of LIBOR plus 1 & 5/8 percent.
As of january 1986, the IMF has released $423 million, com-
mercial banks have provided $575 million; official creditors have
extended new ODA commitments of $1 billion, and a trade facility
worth $3 billion has been restored. Countries such as Argentina,
Chile and Mexico were able to negotiate better terms than the
Philippines in 3985. Spreads were lower on medium and long-term
loans (1 3/8 for Chile and Argentina and 7/8-1 1/4 for Mexico).
The maturities were longer, i.e., 12 years for Chile and Argentina
and 14 years for Mexico (World Bank, 1986).
C. Structural Adjustment
The basic inefficiencies inherent in the economy were addressed188 JOURNAL OF PHI LIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
by structural reforms meant to 1) make the economy more compe-
titive internationally, 2) raise domestic savings, and 3) improve in-
centives for investments and growth. Specifically, the policy re-
forms aimed to encourage more manufactured exports, domestic
substitution of imported energy and higher returns for the farm
sector. In trade, tariffs were reduced to an average28 percent as of
January 1986. As of May 1986, some 1_152 imports have been
liberalized. Industrial incentives were modified to favor exports
and value added. The import liberalization program was however
delayed thereby eroding the impact of lower tariffs.
In energy, programs for managing demand and developing
domestic supply reduced energy dependence to 57 percent in 1984
and 50.6 percent in 1985. Subsidies on electricity used by house-
holds were subject to phasedreduction.
Although agriculture was the only sector which posted a posi-
tive growth in 1985, it used to be one of the most penalized due to
an overvalued currency, pervasive price controls, export taxes and
existence of state trading monopolies. Accordingly, liberalization
measures were carried out, covering trade, marketing and prices.
The international marketing of coconut and the domestic marketing
of sugar have been opened up to more private participants since
February 1985. The price control on rice was dismantled on October
1, 1985 completing the agricultural price decontrol policy. Importa-
tion and trading of wheat, feedgrains and fertilizers is now open to
the private sector.
D.' Realignment of Public Spending
Steps were taken to align public investments with the austere
financial program and to improve their economic and social impact.
The revised investment program wasreduced to only about 4 percent
of GNP, compared with a peak 7 percent of GNP in the 1970s.
The revised program for 1986-1991 as of 1985 amounted to
P178 billion at constant prices, with the bulk during the initial
years accounted for by ongoing programs in energy, agriculture,
and transportation. Around 76 percent of the program for 1986-
1987 was for ongoing projects. Proposed projects were subjected
to the most rigorous financial, economic and social evaluation.
Priority was given to maintenance, agricultural projects and social
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from internal cash generation; reliance on the budget and borrow-
ings will be minimized. The 198(_national budget now provides for
increased allocation to health and education but large expenditures
for debt service and subsidy to failing public corporations remain
heavy drains.
PoliCy studies are being conducted on government corporations,
subsidiaries and assets acquired by the public sector as a result of
foreclosures and other reasons. The objective is to streamline the
corporate sector, raise efficiency and cut costs. Performance
standards are being strictly enforced on existing corporations while
others will be merged and sold to the private sector. Government
financial institutions are also subject to these reforms. Privatization
is being adopted as a matter of public policy, consistent with the
objective of promoting a market-oriented economy.
V. Analysisof impact on Households,The Rural Sector And Public
Expenditures
A. Effects on Household Incomes and Consumption Via Changesin
Employment, Wages,and Prices
The impact of the crisishas been quite adversefor incomeand
its correlates. Real incomes declined, consumption expenditures
fell and the savingsrate went on a downtrend.
Real per capita GNP fell by 4.4 percent in 1985 from the peak
level of P1,933 in 1981, a setback of about 10 years. Compared to
1970, the per capita income level in 1985 showed only a slight in-
crease.Prospects for 1986 indicate that the declining trend is likely
to continue although at a reduced rate (Table 6).
The adverse effects of the crisis are likewise reflected in the
trend in real per capita personal consumption expenditure and
the proportion of income that is saved (or the savings ratio). Real
personal consumption expenditure was generally increasing in the
1970s and the early 1980s. However, this declined by 1.4 percent
and 2.3 percent in 1984 and 1985, respectively. On the other hand,
the savings ratio progressively declined from an annual average of
8.3 percent in 1970-1979 to 5.3 percent in 1980-1982. The trend
worsened as the savings ratio fell to a low 0.9 percent in 1983.
Trend in the last three years indicate that the savingsratio may yet
regain its historical level.TABLE 6
INDICATORS OF INCOME, EMPLOYMENT, PRICES AND WAGE
1970 _971 1972 1973 t974 197S I976 1077 1978 1979 1980 1981 1987 1983 19_1 1985 1986
I. lnd[cator_ of Income and Price_
A. Real Pe_CapitaGNP Ii_ Pesos) 1,353 1,402 1,437 1,628 1,569 1,618 1,690 1,749 1,80I 1,874 1,917 1,933 1,921 1,895 1,723 1,617 1,581
& P-_alPerCapitaCcesurnp_ic_ 1,0T7 1,023 1,028 1,058 1,079 " 1,101 1,125 1,153 1,181 1,206 1,227 1,244 1,251 1,255 1,238 1,210 I,t9t
_i.I%,o_)
C. Savin_ Ratio (%) 5,6 6.2 7.4 &7 8.2 10.9 10.9 10.6 8.3 6.5 6+0 6.5 3.4 0+9 2.4 3+4 2.9 (1st Se._
O. _r, flation Rate, by Aa'ea.{r%)
Philippines 12.9 15.0 16.4 16.2 34.5 6.9 9.7 9,8 7.2 17.5 18.2 13.1 10.2 10.0 50.3 23.] 1.12 (Jan.-Sepi.)
Me_a_Mmaill - 6.9 18.8 15.8 33.5 8.1 5,3 7,8 7.0 19_3 18,6 12,2 11,0 10.8 49.3 20.7 5.64' (Jan.-Sept.)
Areas oulside Mebro .Ma:lq]a - I6.8 15.5 16.0 34.5 6.8 10,6 10.2 7.2 17,2 18.1 13.3 10.1 9.8 50.5 23.6 0.26 tjan.-Sept.)
II. Indicatot_ of Employment
A. i.abor Force Participation Rate {%) 555 59.0 59.6 60,3 59_0 60.7 59.5 56.6 61.1 - 59.7 61.3 60.1 63.6 63.5 63.4 63.8 {Oct.) _._
B_Unemploymerlt Rate {%) 7.2 5.2 6.2 5.3 4.2 4.4 6.3 9,1 7.1 - 8,1 8.9 9.5 7-9 10.6 11.1 11.1 (Oct.) O
C. Underemployrnerlt Rate {%) - 22.1 24.1 22.1 20.0 21-9 21 _3 - -- 34.$ 36.3 34.2 35.9 35.7 33.7 36.0 |Or:L) C
D, Numb_oI-Laid-Olf Wvrl_ers .......... 69,611 78,466 49,557 75,428 92,167 73,832 34,727 [lan.-Nov.) z
>
II. _n_l_iltorsof Wages r-
A. ReaJI_egi_dated Wages(in Peso_} 0
1.Non_ricultu_ "!1
Metre Manila 18.27 19Jl 16.25 14.04 11.59 12.94 1t94 15.4 15.74 17.17 19.36 19.77 _8.06 17.52 1663 1622 15.41 "O
O_iide taetr? fdanila 28.77 20.11 17.41 "i&01 12.3_ 13-90 %3.42 14.28 14.65 16.55 19.00 19.32 17 81 17.48 16 60 15.88 1&90 _[_
r"
2,l_-_l_ .._
Plantalion 72.24 11.94 10.34 &91 1.77 -931 10.33 11.95 12.48 14.19 16,39 16.49 15.27 14.75 13,_9 13.23 13.25 "10
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The effects on employment was just as severe as the growth of
industry plunged to negative levels. Many companies resorted to
either retrenchment or shutdown, displacing in the process thou-
sands of workers. Slack labor demand together with the marked
expansion of the labor force contributed to more unemployment.
The open unemployment rate reached 10.6 percent and 11.1
percent in 1984 and 1985, respectively,comparedto only 7.2 per-
cent in 1970 and 8.1 percent in 1980. As of October 1986, the
national unemployment rate remained at 11.1 percent and may
likely remain significant for the rest of the year. Metro Manila
was worst-hit by the employment situation with 26.1 and 25.8
percent of its workforce unemployed in 1985 and 1986 (April),
respectively,comparedto just 11.1 percent in 1970 and 13.1 percent
in 1980.
More rapidgrowth of the labor force, along with rising inflation,
contributed to a downward pressureomreal wageswhich, in turn, led
to more underemployment. The nationwide underemployment rate
hit an average record-breaking level of 36 percent in 1983 and 1984.
This was moderated to 34 percent in 1985 but rose again to 36
percent in October 1986.
The slowdown in industry was reflected in reduced earnings as
shown by various indicators. The real minimum wage of nonagricul-
tural workers in Metro Manila started to decline in 1982. The same
declining trend can be noted for the real minimum wage of nonagri-
cultural workers outside Metro Manila, but by much less, beginning
1982. The real minimum wages of workers in the agriculture sector
also declined: In 1985, plantation wages began to fall by as much as
5 percent from a record level of P16.49 in 1981 while those of non-
plantation workers declined by a similar rate from a peak of P12.39
in 1981. Trends in the index of real compensation of workers in
major industrial establishments gave the same negative indications.
The index declined from 56.7 in 1983 to 47.7 in 1984 and down to
44._6in 1985.
The cumulative effect of all of the above is a deterioration in
the welfare of the majority of the population. Estimates show that
the incidence of poverty increased by 10 percent during the 1975-
1985 period.Thus in 1985;some 5:7 million familiesor 59.3 percent
of the total are below the overall monthly poverty threshold of
P2,382.
The trend in income distribution was likewise dismal as the192 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
income position of the poorer segments of society deteriorated.
In the last 14 years, income distribution as measured by the GINI
coefficient, showed only a very slight improvement. Moreover,
the decline in per capita incomes alone could have been enough tO
push nutritional levels downwards especially because of the high
subsistence level in the economy. Some :2.4 million families or al-
most 25 percent of the total are below subsistencein 1985.
B. Consequences on Rural Welfare Via Changes in The Price
Structure, Incentive System and Agricultural Productivity and
Incomes
Unlike other sectors of the economy, agriculture had to contend
with the adverse impact of both external factors and the effects of
distorted public policies. The international recession of 1980-8:2,
which brought with it fluctuating and low export and domestic
prices, affected rural welfare to the extent that it negatively influenced
the price structure, the incentives systemand, eventually, productivity
and rural incomes.
A study done recently (NEDA, 1984) noted a generally declining
terms of trade in agriculture from 1970 to 198:2(Table 7). Extending
the analysis up to 1985 shows the same results. This was true in all
existing measures of terms of trade which consider the farmer not
only as a producer but also as a consumer. Agricultural pricing
policies generally favor urban consumers through price controls on
rice, chicken, eggs and other commodities till the controls were
completely lifted in 1985.
Moreover, an incentivessystem that significantly favored industry
wasnoted. Estimates of nominal protection rates (NPR), which com-
pare domestic and border prices of commodities, show general
pricing patterns that are adverset_ agriculture (David, 1983). Effect-
ive protection rates (EPRs), which measure the net effect of various
price interventions in the product and input markets between value
added at domestic andat border prices, indicate an incentive structure
that is heavily biased towards industrY. The trend for the net effect-
ive protection rates (NEPRs) or the EPR corrected for the mis-
valuation of the protection rate as computed by Bale (1985) also
shows non-optimal resource allocation across sectors, with agricul-
ture receiving the leastprotection.
The anti-agricultural bias of domestic policies was due to the
impact of such intervention measures like regulated pricing, govern-Z
c
TABLE 7 c °
IMPACT ON RURAL WELFARE THROUGH CHANGES IN THE PRICESTRUCTURE, m
INCENTIVES SYSTEM AND AGRICULTURAL INCOMES "_
t--
1970 1971 1_2 19"/3 1974 19_ 1976 1977 1978 19"/9 1989 19_1 1982 1983 1984 IgB5 1986 m
x
-4
d- TermsofTradeln Alpicutlum m - m
A, R_t_ of _e Price of AIp%uttu_ Z
Outpu_ to l_ice of A_lc_Jm_ Input 112 101 100 111 106 104 96 92 89 88 74 70 74 n_. n_. n_ n.a,
r
0. R_tio of ffze Priceof Avicutmr'_ ¢O
Output to _ of Industrial Ou,tput_ 97 105 t00 109 103 111 TO6 106 106 t02 90 98 88 89 97 gOt n.a. "r 0
C. Ra6o of t.he Priceof A_ric_Jltural
OUq3L_te PHCeof N_A_lcuttural Output 96 103 100 113 110 102 105 104 103 g9 &B 86 M 85 96 90* n.a_ O'J
D. _tio of _e Priceof A_ultural Z
Output to Co_umer Frice_in Rer'_ Are_ 110 100 106 128 133 132 128 125 1_ 96 92 89 86 93 6_' n.a.
11. Pr_cesMMzj_¢ Afflcul_.rcalgraducu.
(U_. centsp_r pound)
A. Coconut Oil 1&O 16.9 10.6 23.3 45.4 17+9 19.0 26.3 31.0 44.7 30.5 25.9 21.1 33.2 51.3 26,Q t3.4
8. S¢_=r 3.7 4.5 7.3 9.5 30.0 20.4 11.5 83 7.8 9.9 28.7 17.0 8.5 8.5 5.2 4,0 6.1 Ill
C_Copr& t(].2 8,6 6.4 16,0 39.1 11.6 12,$ 18,3 21.4 30.6 20.6 17,?. 14.3 22.5 32.3 17,5 9.0 Z
Ill. Growth in SectoralGros_Value
E
Added I_l (_J
5.0 4,2 4.5 4.7 4.0 3.1 --2.1 2.3 2,4 3.3 Asric_Jltur_ 2.2 4.g 3.8 6.2 2.6 4.3 8,0
Indusl_ 6.7 7.8 7.5 "_2.4 5.6 8.7 10.4 B.4 6.1 7.9 4.7 4.5 2.2 0.7 -10,6 -10.2 -3,7
Services 5,4 4.7 4.5 7.0 63 5.9 6.0 4.9 5.9 5,8 6.2 3.4 3.5 3.2 --6.3 1:0 --1.6
Sou,;ce: NEDA, NCSO_ CBP.
u_
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ment control of trade, export taxes, and special levies which tended
to depress farm prices. The underpricing of agricultural commodities
in the domestic market also affected agricultural production, pro-
ductivity and incomes, and measuresintended to help the farm sec-
tor through price support, irrigation services, and subsidized credit
could not entirely offset the negative effects of such distortive poli-
cies.
Some commercial policies designed to promote industrialization
through the protection of domestic manufacturing have likewise dis-
favored the farm sector. Bale (1985) argues,for instance, that mis-
aligned exchange rates have primarily inhibited better agricultural
performance. Government control on agricultural trade of some
commodities such as rice, sugar, and coconut oil milling capacity
have also tended to shift profit gains from farmer-producers to the
government agenciesinvolved in the trading of these products. Spe-
cifically, findings in sugar show that a) policies favored consumers
rather than producers, implying substantial income transfers from
the latter to the former; and (b) government intervention in sugar
resulted in a net lossin economic welfare (Ledesmaand Raagas,1983).
It should be noted, however, that domestic policies did not solely ac-
count for the declining and negative protection for the sugarindustry
during the years 1975 to 1980. The end of the countw's preferential
accessto the U.S. sugar market with the expiration of the Laurel-
Langley Agreement and the U.S. Sugar Act in 1974 also accounted
for this (David, 1983).
The biasagainst agriculture before reforms were initiated in 1985
have contributed to the wider gap between incomes earned in various
sectors. The income per worker in industry was 4.6 times that of
his agriculture counterpart in 1973 and increased further to 5.2 times
in 1983.Furthermore, a NEDA (1986) study revealed that 2.2 mil-
lion families or 73 percent of the total number of low-income famil-
ies are in agriculture. Another NEDA study (1984), interrelating
post-1975 trends, attests to a widening of welfare differentials in
favor of urban areas, in almost all the broad indicators of welfare,
notably incomes, employment, and prices asaffected by government
intervention policies and fiscal operations.
Despite the adverse impact of external factors and policy biases,
however, agriculture still performed relatively better than the other
sectors of the economy implying the existence of comparative ad-
vantage. It posted positive growths of 2.3 percent in 1984, 2.4 per-NUQUI ET AL: EXTERNAL SHOCKS AND ADJUSTMENT POLICI ES 195
cent in 1985 and 3.3 percent in 1986 while the rest of the economy
.contracted (Table 7).
C. Impact on the Shifts in Government Expenditures Particularly
with Respectto Basic Social Services
The impact of external shocks on social concerns was likewise
felt through the changes in the patterns of budgetary allocation
among major sectors and within social sectors, many of which were
initiated in responseto the crisis itself.
A significant shift in the distribution of government expenditures
among the major sectors of the economy first occurred immediately
before the 1973 oil crisis. Prior to 1972, the social services sector
consistently received the largest budgetary allocation. However, the
government's fiscal response to the first oil shock was to increase the
allocation for economic services to an averageof 40 percent for the
period 1972-1979, with the bulk of the expenditures going to pub-
lic infrastructures and utilities (Table 8).
On the other hand, the share of social services to total govern-
ment expenditures experienced a generally declining trend over the
same period, averaging at 21 percent. Within social services during
the 1970-1979 period, education garnered, on the average,more than
two-thirds of the total allocation, followed by health (17. 8%), social
security and welfare (10.4%), and housing and community.develop-
ment (5.7%).
An analysis of the government expenditures on an urban/rural
basis during the 1978-1980 period indicates that, on a per family real
terms, urban regions (NCR, Ill, IV and VII) benefitted more than
other regions which were predominantly rural (NEDA, 1984). How-
ever, the difference is significantly lower in the outlays for social
services sectors than for the economic sectors. The allocation for
education for instance was higher, on the average, in the rural than
in the urban regions. This pattern is consistent with the population
distribution.
As a result of the fall in social development allocation in the face
of continued rapid population growth, there has been a generally but
slightly increasing trend in the real per capita expenditures on social
services during the seventies. Social services expenditures per person,
in real terms, increased only minimally from P111 in 1970 to P122
in 1979 (Table 8).TABLE 8
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES, 1970-86
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 t975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1960 1981 1982 1983 19_4 1985 1986
7/
L PercentageShy'e, by Sector
A. Economic,Services 28.17 25.19 30.16 41.78 47.70 4,5.89 38.43 34.62 39.62 39.79 38.14 38.39 34,23 29.06 22.02 24.37 18,55
B. SoeialS_rvi¢_ 31.02 30.32 28.18 23.82 22.73 18.64 18.49 T&81 19.56 20.11 21,.05 20.43 22.06 21.64 79.75 20.72 20.94
S_alretoTotal Social Services
1. Education 80.17 8Q.88 79.50 76.30 55.66 59.2.5 62.40 63.01 65.85 39.44 59.74 58.61 $9.53 34.27 60.59 65.13 61.01
2. Housingand Comreunify O_feropm_nt - - 5.08 6.65 1.35 3.74 3.20 12.01 1f.86 13.70 12.73 16.19 9.59 5.28 3,34
3. Hearth 15.97 14,69 15,91 77,53 75.40 20.05 20.34 22.0t 17.79 t8.58 18.11 18.00 20..14 21.74 1&48 18.34 20.18
4. SociaI.Seou¢itYsocial Serv[c_W©lPare and2/ 3.85 4.42 4.59 6,17 23.85 14.05 1&31 11,24 11,16 9.97 10.29 10.29 7,$9 7.80 11.34 11.25 15,47
C. Defe_e 10.05 10.71 9.60 9.96 "14,36 18.39 19.45 "19.80 1,6.43 14.71 13.30 11.31 12-16 12.22 9 88 10-93 6.84
D. General Public Service 27.31 26.74 26.84 1&74 10.70 10.73 18.73 18,79 17.04 16.87 17`93 21,78 21.55 21.26 24`99 18.82 24.48
C
E. Debt Service 3.45 7,04 5.22 5.70 4.51 5..14 4,90 7.97 7.35 8.52 9.58 803 10.00 1&82 23.36 25..16 29,18 _0
Z
0. Real per Capita Government expendi_res _1>
I--
A. TotalsociaJ_[ces 110.70 101.93 97.80 94.71 103.06 108.42 .110,24 98.08 118.88 122.03 117.3f 126.39 122.69 716.56 8296 80.08 94.7B, O ,-n
"I0
1. E_cation 88.77 82.45 77.75 72.26 57.37 64.24 68,79 65,78 78_29 72.54 70,08 74,08 73.04 63.26 50 27 52.'1_. 58.01 "1"
2. Housingand Communhy Deve_opmont - -- --" - 2.15 3.91 6.18 14,65 13.92 16._ 15.62 T8.87 7,93 4.22 3.16 r-
3. He4dth '17.68 14.98 15.56 16.60 15,87 21.74 22.42 22.97 21.14 22_67 21.25 22.74 24.71 23.34 15.33 14.69 13.13 "o
4. S_ial Socuriw, Welfare and -13
SocialServioss2/ 4.25 4.51 4.49 5,84 24.59 f$.24 16.89 11.73 13.28 12_17 12_07 13.00 9.32 9.10 9.40 9.01 14.66 Z
m
O
l/Percento_ uansfe_, to thesesec_cs, m
2/Data from 1976 onwards include ouday for laborand ¢mp[oymenL <_
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Another major shift=in government expenditures allocation was
effected after the second oil shock in 1979. This time, the inter-
national recessionand the ensuingdebt crisis severely impaired the
country'spublic ,investment and other programs. The impact on debt
service of the debt policy response to the two successiveoil price
hikes becameprominent starting1982. The share of debt service to
total budget grew rapidly from 10 percentin 1982 to 29 percent in
1986.and in the process,crowding out priority economicand social
concerns.
Thus, despite countercyclical measuresadopted starting 1983,
the shareof economicservicesto total governmentexpenditurescon-
tinuously declined from=38 percent in 1980 to 19 percent in 1986.
Except for certain major infrastructureswhich requiredlargeoutlays,
the government started to emphasizethe completion of ongoingpro-
jeersandsmaller infrastructures.
Moreover, the needto focus on recurrentexpendituresand fixed
financial liabilities (like equity contributions to governmentcorpo-
rationsand interest payments) also reduced the flexibility to pro-
vide more for programs directly addressedto social conditions. E_-
penditures allocation for socialservicesdid not substantially increase
from 1980 to 1984. There were certain isolated yearswhen itsshare
roseminimally but not enough to sufficiently cushionthe effects of
the crisison huma.nwelfare.
Thus, in terms of real per capita expenditures, social services
never really gained importance in the 1980s. Government expendi-
tures for serial services,in real per capita terms, havebeenfluctuat-
ing with a progressively declining trend in recentyears. Perperson
expenditures fell by 11 percent, from a peak P126 in 1981 to P80
in 1985.
Within the social development sectors, the education subsector
contLnuedto get the lion'sshare (58.6%) for the period 1980-84. A
significant rise in the budget for housing and community develop-
ment was registeredbeginning 1979 following the creation of the
human settlements ministry which spearheadedthe implementation
of the nation's shelter program and the establishment of the Pag-
IBIG provident fund. The share of housing which previously was
only 4.5 percent.of the total socialservicesbudgetrose from 12 per-
cent in 1979 to 16 percentin 1983. Thehealth subsectorwasgetting
almosta constantshareof the public budget in the 1980s despitethe
imp,lementation of the primary health care approach in 1980.198 JOURNAL OF PHI LIPPI NE DEVELOPMENT
National government transfers to highly specialized hospitals which
addressed diseasesof the lung, kidney and heart became significant
from 1983 onwards. Social security, welfare and other servicesin the
meantime continued to receive diminished shares,particularly during
the 1980-1983 period.
Starting in 1985, total outlays of government for social services
began to pick up resulting in a share of 21 percent by the end of
1985. Thus real per capita expenditures rose slightly in 1986 with
the reemphasis given on social development. The situation which
emerged in late 1985 may also be characterized as promising in
terms of subsectoral allocations. The share of social security and
welfare has risen prominently especially in 1986 with the govern-
ment's commitment to addresspoverty more resolutely. Other basic
services like education and health have likewise been given renewed
push, particularly in 1986, in line with the realigned priorities of
government. The shareof housing, in contrast, hasbeen falling begin-
ning 1984 consistent with the thrust on privatization. Although these
trends areencouraging, it can be noted that these arestill insufficient
relative to increased needs arising from a continued rapid expansion
of the population, a worsening unemployment situation, lower nut-
ritional status of many children and declining participation rates in
public elementary education, among others.
VI. Impact Of The CrisisOn SocialConcerns
The socialcostsof the first oil shock were not as profound and
exacting as those of the second oil shock for at least three reasons.
First, the first shock of 1973-1974 was accompanied by high com-
modity prices and did not result in any fall in averageper capita in-
come. Second, the 1979-1980 oil shock was followed by a severe
world recession and a domestic economic crisis which reduced the
averageper capita income to the 1975 level. And third, the financial
capacity of authorities to provide imperative adjustment assistance
inthe 1980s was no longer as much asin the 1970s.
Although the poverty situation was already serious in the early
1970s with poverty incidence for the whole country reaching 45
percent in 1975 as reported by the World Bank, there were indicat-
ions that the social development programs implemented during the
period exerted some positive impact on poverty alleviation. This pro-
bably was brought about by the major shifts in focus and greater• NUQUI ET AL.: EXTERNAL SHOCKS AND ADJUSTMENT POLICIES 199
cost-effectiveness of theseprograms.
Giventhe increasingcostsof healthcareandthe persistence of
communicablediseases, a major shift from the curativeto the pre-
ventive approachto healthcarewasinstituted. The Primary Health
Care(PHC)conceptwhichseeksthe improvementand maintenance
of the health statusof the community was initiated in 1980. The
nationwidedeterioration of the nutritional statusof' the population
similarly prompted the launching of the Philippine Nutrition Prog-
ram (PNP)in 1974principally aimedat thevulnerablegroups,name-
ly, infants,preschoolers,schoolchildrenand pregnantand lactating
mothers.
In education,the comprehensivereview of theeducationsystem
conducted by the Presidential Commission to Survey Philippine
Education (PCSPE)in 1970 found thatthe quality andefficiency of
education have deteriorated through the yearsalthough there has
been a marked expansionin enrolment at all levels.This led edu-
cation authorities to changepriority and focus from equity to the
improvementof the quality and efficiencyof education.According-
ly, the Program for Decentralized Educational Development
(PRODED)waslaunchedin 1981 to raise_hequality andefficiency
ofelementaryeducation.
Likewise, the population program wasreorier]tedfrom simple
fertility reduction to thepromotion of total family welfare.From a
purely clinic-based orientation, the population programevolvedinto
the National Population and Family PlanningOutreachProjectin
1.976with stresson responsible parenthood,maternalandchild care
aswellasfamily planning.
The social services sectoralso shifted emphasis from the provi-
sion of doleouts or direct assistanceto the disadvantagedwhich
only_ncouraged a"mendicant mentality" amongbeneficiariesto the
more developmental approachof inculcating self-reliance.This is
evident in programssuch as the Self-EmploymentAssistance and
Practical Skills Development where individuals are provided with
opportunitiesto beproductiveandself-reliantcitizens.
The housingapproachhas alsoundergonenotablechanges over
the years.Housingwasinitially consideredasa problemof relocating
slum dwellersandsquatters.However,it hasevolvedinto a"human
settlements approach" where the provision of housing is comple-
mented by basic servicessuchas water supp!y, electricity, health
andeducation facilities,other infrastructureand evenlivelihoodacti-200 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
vities. Moreover the formulation of the National Shelter Program in
1975 integrated and synchronized the previous piecemeal and dif-
fused activities in housing production, finance and regulation. This
became instrumental in the construction of a sizeable number of
housing units which were availed of through the Pag-IBIG Provident
Fund by many families.
The results of these programs are reflected in the improvement
of most social indicators although pockets of more serious social
casesexisted particularly in the leastdevelopedregions.By 1979, the
population growth rate was estimated to have deceleratedto 2.4
percent from a high3.0 percentin 1970. The 1980 Census,however,
reported a 2.57 percent growth rate reflecting a slackeningin the
• paceof fertility and mortality reduction (Table 9).
Life expectancy increasedby an additional 3.3 years from 55.9
years in 1970 to 62.2 years in 1982. This was mainly due to im-
provements in crude death rates and infant mortality rates. On the
whole, the prevalenceof malnutrition among preschoolersfell from
21.9 percent in 1978 to 17.2 percentin 1982 although its incidence
remained high in certain depressedareasof the country, i.e., Negros.
Total enrolment grew from 9.3 million in 1970 to 13.1 million.
in 1982. These trends are further supported by improvingtransition
and cohort survival rates. However, low student achievementlevels
particularly in depressedareas were reported by Project SOUTELE
(Survey of Outcomes on Elementary Education) and the resultsof
the National CollegeEntrance Examinations (NCEE) necessitatinga
shift in focus from equity to quality of education. Complementing
formal education was the increased training output of nonformal
programs in responseto the demand for basicand middle skills by
various industries. Not all graduateswere, however, absorbedby in-
dustriesin view of the lackof direct tie-upsbetween •training institu-
tionsand factories andcompanies.
The housingprogramsfrom 1970 to 1982 benefitted 201,984
beneficiaries through the construction of new dwelling units, up-
grading of marginal settlements and sitesand servicesdevelopment.
Most beneficiariesof dwellingunits, however,camefrom the middle
and upper income levels,leavingout many families belongingto the
low-incomegroupswho were the originaltarget of the program.
Service outreach of social servicesprograms addressingthe most
disadvantaged groups increased coverage from 2.3 million toT.6
million during the decade 1972-1982. Social security benefit pay-TABLE 9 -_
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ments for governmentand private employees increasedten-fold from
P191.2 million in 1970 to P2,03_I million by 1982. Similarly, Medi-
care disbursements expanded from P12.6 million to P382 million
during the same period. For a time, these benefits servedto augment
incomes and cushion the impact of the first oil crisis on the people's
welfare. However, the advent of the second oil crisis changed the
situation.
The secondoil crisishad moretelling effects on the socialsectors
compared to the first oil shock. The severecontraction of economic
output brought about by the crisistriggeredwidespread unemploy-
ment, dwindling incomes and spiralling prices which, in turn, halted
and even eroded the socialgainspreviouslyachievedin the past.The
drastic cuts in government expenditures curtailed the delivery of
essentialsocialservices suchashousingandnonformal training.
A. Health
In health, the adverse economic conditions reduced accessto
medical services particularly for the poor as evidenced by generally
decreasing hospital admissions. A deterioration in the health condi-
tions of .thepopulation ensued as indicated by the slackening of the
decline in infant mortality rates (IMR) and the higher incidence of
communicable diseases_particuiarly among infants and children.
From 19.75to .1980, IMR declined by an averageof two percentage
points annually while during the.period 1980-1986, IMR decreased
by only,about one percentagepoint annually. Moreover, there wasa
higher incidence ofmorbidity particularly of communicable diseases
such.asdiarrhea, influenza, pneumonia,tuberculosis, whooping cough,
malaria, measles and schistosomiasis. Children remained to be the
highest at-risk group. Despite the generally rising proportion of
infants and children.,immunized againstthese diseases,the morbidity
rates of tuberculosis, whooping cough and measles have increased
from 1982to1984. ,
To respondto the high cost of medical care, the development
and use of 'herbalmedicines, acupuncture and indigenoushealth
cam technologies have been increasingly advocated. Moreover, the
preventive aspect of health care has been given renewed emphasis
through the priority given to health information/education, envi-
ronmental sanitation and immunization. Furthermore, health prog-
rams have been integrated and intensified to save on much-needed
resourcesand achievegreaterprogramimpact.204 JOURNAL OF PHI LIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
Despite these efforts, however, there was a seriousmisallocation
of health resources.The annual subsidies to specialized health insti-
tutions such as the Philippine Heart Center for Asia, Kidney Found-
ation of the Philippines, Lungsod ng Kabataan and Lung Center of
the Philippines which cater to higher income families were much
higher than the resources allocated to mass-basedprograms such as
Primary Health Care (PHC), malaria eradication or schistosomiasis
control. During the period 1978-1985, the government annual allo-
cation for malaria eradication and schistosomiasis control averaged
only P20 million and P14 million, respectively, while an average
annualsubsidy of more than P100 million wasgarneredby the four
specialized health institutions. Similarly, funds for PHCamounted
to only P45 million in 1984-1985 but the four institutions received
a total of P229 million duringthe sameperiod.
B. Nutrition
The crisis brought about an increasedprevalenceof preschoolers
who are severely and moderately malnourishedfrom 1983 to 1986.
From 17.6 percent in 1983, the prevalencerate increasedto 21.7
percentin 1986.
To arrest malnutrition, innovativeapproachessuchasthe special
food discountproject in identified nutritionally depressed barangays
and food discountstores (KADIWA) were introduced. The KADIWA
approachwas,however, not found to becost-effective due to lack of
clientele focus and high budgetary subsidy. It was largely urban
based, competed with the private sector and did not carry cost-
effective food items.
In the meantime, evidences of malnutrition persisted. Results
of a Food and Nutrition ResearchInstitute (FNRI) surveyconducted
in October 1984 amongselected householdsin Metro Manila showed
that nutrient intakes of respondentsfell short of the recommended
allowancesfor both families with laid-off and employed household
heads.The energy and protein intakes of the employed groups were
82.3 percent and 88.2 percent adequate, respectively, higher than
those in the laid-off group who registered adequacy levels of 79.6
percent for energy and 87.4 percent for protein. A marked deterio-
ration in the adequacy levels of the nutrient intake of the October
sample was also noted compared to the earlier nutrition survey
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The inadequacy in energy can be attributed to the very low fat
intake among Filipino households. Although the country produces
fats and oils more than its consumption level, supply has been in-
adequate to meet the recommended levelfor domestic consumption
since most of these go to exports (UNICEF, 1986).
The sugar workers of Negros were among the hardest hit by the
crisis. With the high costof production coupled with depressed.prices
for sugar, sugarproduction has been drastically reduced leaving'sugar
workers with little or no income. As a result, many families barely
ate one meal a day. In 1984, 26.4 percent of children weighed were
found to be moderately and severely underweight. The regional hos-
pital in Bacolod City hasreported 370 child and infant deaths during
the first half of 1985, 67.4 percent higher than the figure recorded
during the sameperiod in 1984.
C. Education
Upward trends in the .movements of overall education indicators
(public and private), i.e., enrolment, transition rate, cohort survival
rate somehow becloud the adverseimpact of the economic crisison
education. However, a close scrutiny of government education
reveals a gradual deterioration in the quality and accessto edu-
cational opportunities.
At the public elementary level, participation rates, retention
rates and cohort survival rates decelerated from 198:2 to 1985.
Due to reduced affordability to sendchildren to school,only 89.6
percent of the 7-12 school-goingage population enrolled in public
schoolsin 1985 comparedto 91.7 percent in 1982. Retention rates
fel_l from 91.5 percent to 90.9 percent during the 3-year period.
Only 64 studentsout of every 100 were ableto complete elementary
education in 1985 compared to 67 in 1982. Thesetrendsarerather
surprisingin the light of the implementation of PRODED which is
specifically aimed at raisingthe quality andefficiency of elementary
education.
In terms of allocation of government expenditures, education
consistently constituted the major chunk of social servicesexpen-
ditures though its sharehas been declining from 1974 to 1983. The
persistentclamor for higher salariesby public school teacherswhich
was manifested in long-drawn mass leavesand strikes resulted in
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and Sports (MECS) from 1984 to 1986. Within the sector, while
primacy isgiven to elementary education in accordance with the
Constitutional mandate, only P8.8 million went to elementary edu-
cation in 1985 compared to PI.8 billion which was allocated to
state colleges and universities (SCU).
In effect, expenditures for elementary education constituted a
mere 0.5 percent of the total allocation for state colleges and
universities in 1985. The proportion of elementary education expen-
ditures to SCU expenditures has, in effect, been deteriorating from
about 2 percent in 1975 to 0.5 percent in 1985 in view of the
establishment of more state colleges and universities in recent years.
A review of the allocation of resources within the sector is in order to
channel limited education resourcesfrom tertiary to basiceducation,
which is the sector's foremost priority. This becomes more impera-
tive in the light of the ratification of the new Constitution which
includes a provision for free secondary education.
Meanwhile, a recent Survey on the Out-of-School Youth (OSY)
reveals that there were about 3.4 million OSYs in 1985. Of this
total, lessthan 200,000 or about 5 percent had undergone vocation-
al training. This inability to expand training outreach may be ex-
plained by the cutbacks in training expenditures which reduced train-
ing output from a peak of 195,015 in 1982 to 89,524 in 1986.
D. Housing
Drastic cuts in the budget resulted in a sharp drop in housing
construction from a high of 36,426 new dwelling units in 1983 to
only 17,769 new units in 1985 under both government-assisted and
government-financed projects. Government housing projects in the
pipeline were either cancelled or deferred. Government involvement
in housing became limited, focusing mostly Government involvement
in housing became limited, focusing mostly on sites and services
development and the upgrading of marginal settlements which
catered to the low-income groups.
The tight money situation brought about a reduction of the regu-
lar flow of funds into the Secondary Mortgage Market, subsequently
constraining the banking system from servicing the housing needsof
more borrowers. To be able to accommodate more low-income
members, the interest rates of the Pag-IBIG Home Lending Program
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housing units. Furthermore, Pag-IBIG shifted its thrust to provident
loans to enable more members to avail of the services. However, as
more firms closed down and employees and workers found them-
selvesunemployed due to depressed businessconditions, the rate of
increase in Pag-IBIG members and contributions dropped substantial-
ly. Certain sectors even agitated for exemption until the mandatory
fund contribution was temporarily suspended for an evaluative re-
view in early 1986. It has since resumed operations but at reduced
rates of contribution. Moreover, Pag-IBIG contributions were made
voluntary for both employees and employers effective January I,
1987.
Nevertheless, the housing shortage remains critical particularly
in Metro Manila in view of the unabated migration to the cities in
quest of better income opportunities. As of 1985, Metro Manila
slum dwellers were estimated to have reached I .9 million.
E. Demographic Impact
The major cut in the government contribution to the population
program, from P177.5 million in 1982 to P94.2 million in 1983, con-
strained the promotion of family planning which, in turn, affected
the attainment of targeted contraceptive prevalencerates (CPR). The
CPR slid from 45 percent in 1982 to 34 percent in 1983. There has,
likewise, been a deceleration in the rateof decline in crude birth rate
(CBR). During the period 1975-1979, CBR was declining at an ave-
ragerate of about one percentagepoint whilein 1980-1985, only an
estimated 0.3 percentage point decline was noted. As a result, the
National Demographic Survey of 1983 reported that population
growth could behigher than wasearlierprojected, basedon the 1980
Census.
As a responseto raise family incomes, the crisis increased the
participation of women in the labor force. Their labor force partici-
pation rate (LFPR) increased from 34 percent in 1975 to 42 per-
cent in 1980, and then to 46.2 percent in October 1986. Early stud-
iesshowed that increasedLFPR of women hasa negativeimpact on
fertility. However, more recent researchesrevealthat reducedfertili-
ty isachievedonly if women work away from the home. Home-based
livelihood activities do not effectively deterfertility.
F. On the Welfare of Children and Other Critical Concerns
Children were the most affected by the crisis. There has been a208 JOURNAL OF PHI LIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
significantly higher admission rate for abandoned and neglected
children in government child institutions during the crisis period com-
pared with previous years. The Reception and Study Center reported
admissions totalling 2,306 abandoned children in 1985 compared to
a lower 941 in 1983. It was also observedthat there wasa tendency
to give up children right after birth, probably to avoid the high cost
of infant care.
Moreover, meageropportunitiesfor schooling and employment
have swelled the number of street children selling newspapers, ciga-
rettes, sampaguita and doing odd jobs such as car watching and car
cleaning. In Metro Manila alone, street children were estimated to
number from 50,000 to 75,000. The exposure of theseyoung people
to street life has made majority of them vulnerable to prostitution,
drug abuse and juvenile delinquency.
To temporarily mitigate the adverse effects of the crisis, social
adjustment assistancein the form of unemployment assistanceloans,
social security and Medicare benefit payments, and various social
services were extended to the disadvantaged. However, these pallia-
tives failed to abate the corrosive effects of the crisis on family struc-
tures and processes.The chronic sociological maladjustment of some
families to crisis situations was manifested through non-support by
the household head, wife and child abuse, excessive drinking, aban-
donment of children and the like. For families of overseasworkers
who have been left behind, accounts of acts of infidelity and income
mismanagement by the spousehave been reported (Sevilla, 1982).
VII. Conclusionsand Recommendations
Longstanding structural problems, worsenedby external shocks
and corresponding adjustment policies, largely contributed to the
worst economiccrisisexperiencedin the Philippines. Sincelate 1983,
while the government responseto the recenteconomic crisisresulted
in initial successes in itsstabilization program,this wasachievedwith
large economic and social costs. As output shrank and unemploy-
ment increased,the crisis constrainedthe financial capacity of autho-
rities to provide imperative adjustment aid as much as it did in the
1970s. Clearly, the crisis indicates the need for a reappraisalof go-
vernment strategy to give priority to the human dimension.The ob-
jective is not only to attain stability and growth but more important-
ly, to protect the welfare of the most vulnerable groups during cri-NUQUI ET AL.: EXTERNAL SHOCKS AND ADJUSTMENT POLICIES 209
tical periods. The development path implied by this objectiv e is a
strategy that is as expansionary as possiblewithin the limits set by
external finance and other policy considerations.
While restructuring towards :expanding exports and import-
substitutes is essential,strict stabilization policies, consistingof de-
pressingimports through cuts in government expenditure and falling
output, should be minimized. Achieving an improved external posi-
tion through deflationary policiesis I_ely to affect vulnerablegroups
adversely. Moreover, it only brings temporary relief and will reduce
medium-term growth prospectsby depressing investment.
The main element of sucha strategy isbetter managementof in-
ternal and external difficulties through an emphasison agricultural
modernization and rural-based,labor-intensiveprograms.The _xpan-
sionarypolicy whichwill supportthisstrategy requiresthe continued
implementation of critical reforms, including fiscal reconstruction
favoringpriority programsrelated with the adoption of accommoda-
tive monetary policies. It will further necessitateno lessthan the full
cooperation of the IMF and the international financial community
in o_ercoming the external debt problem and resumingvoluntary
lending. Protecting vulnerable groups;raisinghouseholdand family
welfare; enhancing the impact of social programs; and developing
appropriate monitoring and surveillancesystemsare the other indis-
peosableaspectsof the effort to effect an adjustment processwith a
humanface.
..!. :Managing Exterzlal Shocks. Small economieslike that of the
Phitigpines are mainly recipients of external shocks and have very
littlet 'choice except to adjust internally. In the period 1973-1985,
the Philippines was severely affected by terms of trade, recession-
inducedand interest rate shocks.Its adjustment policieswerenot ge-
nerally effective and:led to a seriousdebt crisissince late 1983. In a
few cases,i.e., ener_/substitution and export development, modest
successwasachieved. It is recommendedthat a development strate-
gy which is expansionary and rural-based be adopted. In this way,
economic recovery can be most competitively and effectively
achievedand the socialreturnswill be mostappropriately felt by the
majodty of the population and vulnerable groups. The developed
economies should similarly adopt adjustment and growth-oriented
policies which,do not harm other countries.
2. Accelerating the Development of the Agricultural Sector. In
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strategy, structural reforms already being actively undertaken by go-
vernment in agriculture should be sustained. Past policies have been
found to have penalized agriculture and the rural sector in general.
External shocks further added to the adverse impact of unsound
policies. Considering that two-thirds of the population live in the
rural areas, it is only imperative that development be focused on
activities which will directly address their needs. These reforms
should eventually: a) remove any remaining policy disincentives;
b) promote activities which will help small farmers gain increased
accessto credit and other product markets; and c) hasten the deve-
lopment of appropriate technology, the upgrading of extension ser-
vices, and the expansion o_ agrarian reform With a complementary
packageof inputs.
3. Enhancing the Growth of the Rural Non-Agricultural Sector.
To fully promote rural development,productiveemployment should
be promoted side by Side with agricultural modernization. It is
recommended that government should develop a rural non-agri-
cultural development strategy with emphasison: a) cottage, small
and medium-scale enterprises; b) export.oriented labor-intensive
industries;and c) the informal or unorganizedsector. Accordingly,
policy reforms should be pursuedalongthe following lines:a) redi-
rection of investment away from urban areasand from large and
heavy industries;b) reform of the credit sector to favor the rural
non-farm sector; c) developmentof rural infrastructurefor both agri-
culture and ancillary activities suchas rural roadsand electricity; d)
provisionof employment through labor-basedpublic works scheme;
and e) decentralizationof governmentprogramsand strengtheningof
rural institutions.
4. Implementing Priority Programs. The economic crisis has
brought about seriouseconomic and social problemswith medium-
and long-term implications. Aside from the rural-oriented develop-
ment strategy, other areas need immediate reforms. The national
budget hasto take a more developmentalrole. This requiressupport
to more critical programsfor preventivehealth, nutrition and prima-
ry education, the privatization of publicly-acquired assets,and the
adoption of debtservice reduction schemes.The tax systemcan be
made more equitable and productive through progressiveand fair
taxes. Tax reforms should focus on efficient and equitable mobili-
zation of domestic reso_ces. In this regard, new taxes, designedto
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include increased taxes on luxury items, liquor and cigarettes. Such
taxes on lesssocially desirable activities will permit a higher level of
government expenditures. Government corporations also need to
raise their internal earnings to ensure the continued provision of
basic services and to avoid larger subsidies. More critically, the
private sector should respond more actively to the stabilized poli-
tical climate and economic situation. With a more dynamic private
sector and an internationally competitive economic structure, the
economy can better cope with its present challenges.
5. Overcoming the External Debt Problem. The outstanding
external debt of $26.2 billion is high by any standard. This debt
overhang will continue to drag development efforts due to high debt
service payments unless constructive solutions are implemented.
Hence_growth and development objectives should be giventop prio-
rity in the implementation of adjustment programs.
It is therefore recommended that the international community
grant longer and multi-year rescheduling relief by extending the
consolidation and restructuring periods to at least 20 and 25 years,
respectively, instead of the present shorter periods being applied.
Innovative debt burden-sharing schemes such as a cap on interest
payments and conversion of debt to equity need to be pursued by
both creditors and debtors. This may also include a moratorium of
payment of old debts to support growth and export programs and
equitable sharing of export receipts. Payment of old debts can be
subordinated to fresh credit thus promoting growth and exports.
Litigati,on and other legal options need to be pursued in casesof
loans incurred under questionable circumstances. Moreover, there is
no moral basisfor the nonrestructurable character of the loans from
multilateral agencieslike the World Bank.
Just sharing of the debt burden by all parties is the guiding prin-
ciple that is called for by the presentsituation. While it is the respon-
sibility of debtor countries like the Philippines to undergo structural
adjustment programs, it is the responsibility of the international cre-
ditors to provide a macroeconomic environment that is conducive
to reducing the adverse conditions for debtors. However, recent ex-
perience shows that asdebtor countries tried to boost their exports
in an effort to earn foreign exhange to pay the interests, the indus-
trial countries protected their markets against these exports. The
proposed approach, in contrast_ is expected to reduce the largecom-
ponent in the national export which goesto non-productive activities212 JOURNAL OF PHi LIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
such asdebt-service and interest payments.
6. Redesigning Stabilization Programs with IMF Support. The
PhiJippines has had severalstandby and other IMF-supported pro-
grams to achieve stabilization goals, i.e., balance of payments and
price stability. In 1985, the deflationary and harsh conditions im-
posed by the IMF heavily contributed to the severedecline of per
capita income to its 1975 level, and to the less than minimum bud-
getary requirements for priority social programs to protect human
conditions.
It is recommended that future IMF programs give priority to the
resumption of economic growth and sufficiently provide for essential
social servicesto address basic needs. In this way, exports can be ge-
nerated faster and the internal capacity to pay external obligations
can be raised without the risk of generating destructive political and
social tensions. The Philippine experiencehasestablishedthat ortho-
dox IMF principles need to be modified to explicitly consider the
human dimension of economic adjustments.
7. Mobil/zing International Support and Cooperation. The in-
ternational community has positively responded to the needs of
countries affected by external economic shocks and natural disas-
ters. This response mechanism can be further enhanced through
improved assessmentof local needs in cooperation with donors to
avoid undue duplication of efforts and to increasethe relevance and
effectiveness of aid. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the
Unite5 Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) have ably responded
to the priority needs of the Philippines during its present crisis
situation by extending a soft loan to complete priority develop-
ment projects and by mobilizing additional external assistancefrom
other generous multilateral and bilateral sources for needy children
and livelihood programs, respectively.
8. Enhancing the Impact of Social Services. In pursuit of the
goals of poverty alleviation and social justice, priority in the alloca-
tion of government expenditures during_ the period 1987-1992
should be given to the delivery of basic social services.Cognizant of
the awesome task of reducing poverty incidence and effecting a
more equitable distribution of income and wealth, more focused and
cost-effective programs need to be implemented on a wider scale.
Programs should concentrate on disadvantaged areasand on spe-
cific poverty groups, namely, the landless farmers, plantation work-
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poor. To obtain maximum impact, program emphasis across and
within sectors should be clearly defined. The allocation of resources
within sectors and among regions should be reviewed to correct mal-
distribution and to ensure that the bulk of resourcesgoesto avowed
priorities. Moreover, cost and resource minimizing alternatives in the
design of projects and activities have to be identified and adopted.
It is recommended that innovative and community-based social
services properly linked up With employment-generating and rural-
based activities be promoted. Complementary to this is the strength-
ening of capacity building at the grassroots level to improve access
to basic services. This will require intensification of institutional re-
forms, i.e., decentralization of public services,community organiza-
tion and mobilization, and greater coordination with non-govern-
ment organizations.
Towards improved health and nutritional status, the concept of
PHC should be broadened to cover the whole continuum of health
care from the preventive to the curative aspects. Immunization,
breastfeeding, maternal and child health services, environmental
sanitation and health and nutrition education should bestrengthened
and improved without diminished attention to the control of
communicable diseasessuch asdiarrhea through oral rehydration.
In education, the improvement of the quality of education and
training particularly basic education continues to be the most formi-
dable task considering the need to arrest alarmingdeclines in partici-
pation rates, cohort survival rates and retention rates.
In housing, the main role of government should be limited to ur-
gently-required slum upgrading, squatter relocation and sites and ser-
vices development for marginal income families. The production of
housingstock to covernatural growth andreplacement requirements
shouldbe left to the private sector.
Family welfare should be enhanced through the promotion of
small families and responsible parenthood. This is to be pursued
with due respectto the right of couplesto determine the sizeof their
family and choose voluntarily the meanswhich conform with their
moral convictionsand religiousbeliefs.
9. Monitoring the Nature and Impact of the Adjustment Pro-
cess.The recent crisis hasgenerated a set of development challenges
requiring closer surveillance and timely intervention. This situation
best illustrates the need for a better understanding and timely anti-
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domestic impact process. This will help avert their most likely nega-
tive effects. The statistical system should therefore conduct special-
ized surveys from time to time similar to the one undertaken in 1985
on the status and condition of the subsistence population andother
disadvantaged groups but such should be expanded to provide a
system for predicting basic nutritional status. Small area statistical
collection should also be pursued in depressed areas of the country.
APPENDIX
Analytical Framework on the Estimation of External Shock Effects
and Policy Responses
The point of departure in developing the analytical framework is
the balance of payments identity:
(p_ Xl _ pm M1) + (Xh _ Xt ) = (Rt _ R1 ) 1 01 1 1 1
h h h t
+ (X1 --X1) + (M1 - M1) +(M1 -M1)
R1 = actual resourcegap in year 1
Rt = trend resource gap in year 1 ,.1
X1 = actual exports
M1 = actual imports
h
X1 = hypothetical exports in year 1
M t
1 = trend imports in year 1
Mh
1 = hypothetical imports in year 1
X1 t = trend exports in year 1NUQUI ET AL.: EXTERNAL SHOCKS AND ADJUSTMENT POLICI ES 215
pm = growth rate in import price between years 0 and I 01
P× = growth rate in export price between years 0 and 1
01
The left hand side of the equation indicates the effects of exter-
nal shocks on the balance of payments; _These are decomposed into
X m
a) the terms of trade effect •(P01 X1 - P 0M1 ), and (b) the export
volume.(xhl -- X1 t )effect:
The right-hand side consists of terms representing policy respon-
ses to external shocks, i.e, aplditional net external financing
(R_ 77 R.), increases in the country's export sbare_,jn the world
market {_ - X1 ), im.port substitution. (Mi - ,,.1) and the
effec_ of ,Iower.GDP growth rates (M_ _ _t) on the country's
exports. • , .
The .identity defines external shocks as the sum of the terms of
trade effects _and export volume. Terms of trade (1_01X1 - Pol M1)
is defined, as the difference between, export price effects and
impbrt,"price effects. The estimation • of the terms of trade was
measured from 1971ol 973 base.
_ "lObeeffec't on export demand js the difference between hypothe-
t)._ (Xtl) are tical,and, ,:trend_,; exports (xhl -- XI Tredd exports, derived
on the assumption that the trend ,of foreign demand remained the • q.;,
same as.in :the.period 1963-I 973 andithat the country maintained its
1971-1.9"_3:s.hare in'export• market_ Hypothetical exports (X_) are
derived on the assumption that ,_h.ecountry's exports rose .at the
same _rate..,asl..wor d exports from. 1197'1-1973 base •and that the coun-
try maintained its 1971-1 973 sharel in world exports.
,.Am_ng policy measures taken _in.response tO external shocks,
th_.ai_01Jint of additional .net external,financing (R; - R1) has
been estimated as the difference bdtween the actual resource gap and
the:trend value of the resofirc"e gap. The actual •resource gap (R1) is
'l' " i ,; ,,'.. =,l i
the difference between actual exports and imports (X1 M 1). Trend
resource gap (R_) . . t is meast_rgd by.subtracting trend tmports (M1 )
from trend• exports iX_)..li::S'houl_ :be noted that in the calculation
of the resource gaps only m=.rchandise trade was included. Non-
merchandise trade,_nd transfers were excluded.
• ,The .effects of=export•promotion (xhl -- X] ) have been represen-
ted by changes in exports, expressed in 1971-1973 base.
'report. substitution. is:the difference, between actual imports and216 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
hypothetical imports (M] -- Mhl). Hypothetical imports (M h] ) are
calculated based on the actual growth rate of GDP in the country on
the assumption that the income elasticity of import demand re-
mained the same as in the 1963-1973 period.
The effects on imports of lower economic growth rates is defined
as the difference between trend and hypothetical imports IM h.
M_). Trend imports (Mr1) are calculated on the assumption that""the
income elasticity of import demand and GDP growth both remained
at the 1963-1973 level.
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